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Abstract
This article investigates whether a military revolution took place in the German lands during 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, with the potential to transform institutions and to 
alter contemporaries’ attitudes not merely to war, but to politics and diplomacy. The scholarly 
debate about a metamorphosis of warfare during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods 
involves three connected controversies: the meaning and timing of any ‘revolution’ in the 
conduct of war, the existence of a ‘total war’ in or after 1792, and the continuation of ‘cabinet 
warfare’ by the majority of the German states. Recently, historians have argued that the 
geographical and political diversity of the German states, in conjunction with popular criticism 
of the burdens and sacrifices of conflict in southern and western Germany, militated against a 
broad military revolution. This study contends that such reactions were themselves indicative 
of the transformation wrought by the conscription of more mobile and destructive mass armies 
in a seemingly unending series of wars, which ensured that military conflicts impinged more 
fully on civilian life.
Keywords
Revolutionary Wars, Napoleonic Wars, conscription, cabinet war, military reform, German 
states
Most Prussian and Austrian officers seem to have expected the campaign of 1792, begun 
by France’s declaration of war against Piedmont, Austria, and Prussia on 20 April, to be 
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p. 88. The figures are contested: see, for instance, Owen Connelly’s criticism (Journal of 
Military History LXXI, 2007, p. 921) of David Bell’s claim that ‘France alone counted 
close to a million war deaths’ (The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of 
Warfare As We Know It, Boston, 2007, p. 7): ‘the French lost only 86,500 killed in action, 
not one million, which is the casualty figure, including killed, wounded, deserters, captured 
and missing. By contrast, in World War I, in four years, 1,400,000 French were killed in 
action.’ Many more soldiers and civilians died in the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods 
of wounds, war-related diseases, and freezing, complicating direct comparisons of this kind.
  3 For a summary of historiographical differences of opinion, see R. Pröve, Militär, Staat und 
Gesellschaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Munich, 2006). On ‘world war’, see S. Förster, 
‘The First World War: Global Dimensions of Warfare in the Age of Revolutions’, in R. 
Chickering and S. Förster, eds, War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815 (Cambridge, 2010), 
pp. 101–16.
  4 A.N. Liaropoulos, ‘Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: 
The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Journal of Military 
History LXX (2006), p. 366.
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a ‘promenade to Paris’, in the words of one French émigré.1 In the event, the fighting 
between revolutionary or Napoleonic France and the German states continued, with few 
interruptions, for the next 23 years. Around 5 million Europeans, out of a total population 
of 190 million (1800), were killed in combat or through war-related diseases. According 
to one estimate, 2,532,000 soldiers perished on the battlefield or through wounding, 
making up more than 5 per cent of men of fighting age.2 Historians disagree about the 
nature, impact, and continuity of such warfare, but few question the fact that it consti-
tuted part of a revolutionary threat to the foundations of the Continent’s anciens régimes, 
creating the impression or reality of rapidly changing social, economic, and political 
conditions, and that it menaced the very existence of states, transforming the map of 
Europe and – via overseas expeditions (Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, 1798–9) and the 
naval war with Britain (1793–1802, 1803–15) – the wider world.3 This study reassesses 
the military impact of such revolutionary transformations.
The scholarly debate about a metamorphosis of warfare during the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic periods rests on two connected controversies: one concerning a ‘military 
revolution’ and the other, ‘total war’. The dispute about a ‘revolution in military affairs’ 
has been complicated, despite agreement about the occurrence of ‘a radical change or 
some form of discontinuity in the history of warfare’, in the words of one recent com-
mentator, by a lack of ‘consensus regarding how and when these changes or 
discontinuities take place, or what causes them’.4 Some scholars have concentrated on 
‘battlefield technologies’ and ‘war-fighting techniques’, whereas others have paid more 
attention to the relationship between a military transformation and ‘the broader socio-
political changes that a revolution involves’.5 The debate originally centred on a series of 
claims by historians of the early modern era that changes in military technology – either 
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  7 G. Parker, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560–1660: A Myth?’, Journal of Modern History 
XLVIII (1976), pp. 195–214; idem, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the 
Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge, 1988).
  8 Parker, Military Revolution, p. 153.
  9 P. Paret, ‘Napoleon and the Revolution in War’, in idem, ed., The Makers of Modern Strategy 
(Princeton, 1986), p. 124.
 10 J.A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary 
France, 1791–1794 (Urbana, IL, 1984); S. Wilkinson, The French Army before Napoleon 
(Aldershot, 1991); J. Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1999), and idem, 
‘Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered’, War in History I (1994), pp. 215–32.
 11 A. Gat, ‘What Constituted the Military Revolution of the Early Modern Period?’, in Chickering 
and Förster, War in an Age of Revolution, pp. 21–48; M. van Creveld, Technology and War 
(New York, 1991). See also A. Latham, ‘War Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs’, European Journal of International Relations VIII (2002), 
pp. 231–4.
the introduction of muskets (Michael Roberts) or the construction of fortifications and 
new types of artillery (Geoffrey Parker) – required increases in the size of European 
armies and necessitated higher taxation and a larger state, with the greatest changes tak-
ing place in the first century or so of the period between 1500 and 1800. Roberts con-
tends that Gustavus Adolphus introduced linear formations of infantry with guns during 
the Thirty Years War (1618–48), in conjunction with more aggressive cavalry charges, 
which, in turn, pointed to the need for better trained, more disciplined soldiers and a new 
system of drill, uniforms, and standing armies.6 Parker extends and modifies Roberts’s 
thesis, identifying the invention of new artillery fortifications in early sixteenth-century 
Italy (the trace italienne) as the cause of a shift towards defensive wars, sieges, and 
increased garrisons.7 The ‘culmination’ of this revolution purportedly came in the mid-
eighteenth century. It was followed by innovations deriving from ‘small wars’ (kleine 
Kriege) such as light infantry and cavalry, the formation of self-contained divisions, the 
advent of standardized and mobile artillery, and – during the French Revolution – further 
increases in the size of armies, which have been termed a ‘second military revolution’: 
‘The scale of warfare was so totally transformed that it might be said that another “mili-
tary revolution” had occurred.’8 Parker’s claim coincides with that of Peter Paret, who 
alludes to the standardization of parts for artillery under Jean-Baptiste Vaquette, Comte 
de Gribeauval, and the formation of divisions under Victor-François de Broglie, follow-
ing France’s defeat at the battle of Rossbach in the Seven Years War: ‘The French 
Revolution coincided with a revolution in war that had been under way through the last 
decades of the monarchy. Soon the two meshed.’9 Other historians have examined pre-
Napoleonic changes in tactics and the reorganization of the infantry in a similar way.10
Scholars such as Azar Gat and Martin van Creveld have questioned not the fact that 
armies expanded and became permanent institutions, nor that centralized and powerful 
monarchies were established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but that military 
innovations were largely responsible for the emergence of the modern state.11 Rather, it 
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Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XXXVIII (1985), pp. 7–25; C. Jones, ‘The Military 
Revolution and the Professionalisation of the French Army under the Ancien Régime’, 
in M. Duffy, ed., The Military Revolution and the State, 1500–1800 (Exeter, 1980), pp. 
29–48; J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800 
(London, 1991).
 13 A. Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford, 2006), p. 503.
 14 G.A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (Oxford, 1955), p. 60.
 15 Bell, First Total War; R. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from 
Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington, IN, 1991), p. 290; T.C.W. Blanning, The French 
Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802 (London, 1996), p. 101. See also R. Chickering, ‘Total 
War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept’, in M.F. Boemeke et al., eds., Anticipating Total 
War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 13–28.
is argued, the size of armies depended on the capacity of states to borrow and to raise 
taxes, which was sometimes accelerated by wars, the production of arms, and the profes-
sionalization of armies, but which was also linked to the growth of capitalist economies, 
the development of more efficient or reliable bureaucracies, and the creation of credit 
markets and central banks.12 The implication of Gat’s argument is that armies depended 
on ‘modernization’ – state-building, commerce, administrative techniques, finances – 
which continued to take place, often incrementally, in the eighteenth century. ‘Contrary 
to the widely accepted view among scholars, it should be emphasized that revolutionary 
France was no more able than earlier states in history to keep over 1 percent of her popu-
lation under arms for any prolonged period of time,’ he points out:
No miracles were performed here. With a population of some 25 million, France reached a peak 
of 750,000 soldiers in 1794 only at a price of economic mayhem, and numbers fell to around 
400,000 the year after, where they remained until the end of the decade.13
Briefly, however, French regimes and those of their opponents did manage to raise 
unprecedented numbers of troops, albeit comprising a historically comparable percent-
age of the population. Prussia’s troops constituted more than 5 per cent of its total popu-
lation, though including many foreigners, during the Seven Years War (260,000) and 6 
per cent, with fewer soldiers from other states and with part of its territory recently 
annexed, in 1813 (280,000).14 The effort required to levy and support such numbers of 
soldiers, over many years of sporadic conflict, has prompted historians such as David 
Bell to label the Napoleonic Wars ‘the first total war’.15 The term, of course, was coined 
in the interwar era to describe an allegedly complete mobilization of societies’ resources 
for the sake of the war effort. Bell argues that this mobilization was necessarily incom-
plete in the twentieth century and that the decisive shift towards an attempted mobiliza-
tion occurred not in 1914–18, but in 1792–1815. His case rests on four propositions: 
first, that there was a political dynamic, created by the revolution, towards total engage-
ment and the abandonment of restraint; second, that there was a widespread fear in 
France of a ‘war of extermination’, waged by the Coalition, which fostered a demoniza-
tion of the nation’s enemies, including non-combatants, an escalation of French war aims 
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 17 See William Mulligan’s review of Bell’s study in the Journal of Modern History LXXX 
(2008), p. 912. Also, W. Mulligan, ‘Total War’, War in History XV (2008), pp. 211–21. 
On the conflation of the terms ‘total war’, implying a total mobilization of resources, and 
‘modern war’, resting on ‘the fruits of industrialization and technological innovation’, see 
H. Strachan, ‘On Total War and Modern War’, International History Review XXII (2000), 
p. 351.
 18 M. Broers, ‘The Concept of “Total War” in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period’, War in 
History XV (2008), pp. 248, 256.
 19 Ibid., p. 253. Also, P. Gueniffey, La politique de la Terreur: essai sur la violence révolution-
naire, 1789–1794 (Paris, 2000).
 20 Broers, ‘Concept of “Total War”’, p. 267.
 21 Ibid., pp. 259, 265.
 22 Ibid., p. 253. This argument rests on Broers’s extensive work on Napoleonic imperialism 
in Italy – in Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy, 1773–1821 (Lampeter, 
1997), The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European 
Context? (Basingstoke, 2005), Politics and Religion in Napoleonic Italy: The War against 
God, 1801–1814 (London, 2007) – and on banditry, in Napoleon’s Other War: Bandits, 
Rebels and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions (New York, 2010).
on ‘defensive’ grounds, and a general radicalization of warfare; third, that it proved dif-
ficult to end wars, as their human and political costs and their expected economic and 
diplomatic benefits multiplied, especially under Napoleon, who was ‘the product, master 
and victim of total war’; and, fourth, that ‘new understandings of war’ – or a ‘culture of 
war’, separable from nationalism and revolutionary ideology, although deriving from the 
‘intellectual transformations of the Enlightenment’ and ‘the political fermentation of 
1789–92’ – developed their own momentum and justified more extreme or extensive 
forms of national sentiment.16
Much of the debate, which refers to long-standing controversies concerning the definition 
and character of ‘total war’, concerns the ‘fusion of war and politics’.17 Thus, even a critic of 
Bell such as Michael Broers ‘acknowledges the intellectual and cultural presence of the con-
cept of “total war” among the leadership of revolutionary France’, not least because ‘their 
sacred and profane intellectual baggage abounded in examples of “total war”, defined in 
terms of “absolute enmity” as well as material obliteration’, from the struggle of Rome and 
Carthage to Samuel’s story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible.18 Such conceptions were 
purportedly accompanied by ‘absolute enmity’ between opponents, with ‘intense hatreds – 
spawned as much by the hard realities of fighting wars with mass peasant armies as by propa-
ganda’.19 What restricted warfare, preventing it from becoming total, in Broers’s view, was 
‘the lack of effective technology’ of killing and ‘the survival of rulers still imbued with 
enough of the political ethos of the old order, and even of the Enlightenment, to hold in check 
the temptation to unleash all the forces they had’.20 ‘Power still rested in the hands of men of 
the old order, at least among the allies’, he contends, meaning that states remained ‘resolutely 
civilian in character, if not in purpose’.21 The ‘best test of the term “total war”’ is therefore 
held to be ‘not whether it effectively mobilizes resources or how much damage it does, but 
how mass mobilization and prolonged campaigning are received by the populations sub-
jected to them’.22 Bell argues that both contemporary meanings of a levée en masse – a 
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and Förster, War in an Age of Revolution, p. 69. Chickering and Förster have edited six 
volumes, all with ‘total war’ as the main theme.
 25 Ibid. Chickering argues in the introduction to War in an Age of Revolution that changes 
in combat ‘laid the moral and ideological foundations’ of total war (p. 3). Dierk Walter, 
‘Reluctant Reformers, Observant Disciples: The Prussian Military Reforms, 1807–1814’, 
and Wolfgang Kruse, ‘Revolutionary France and the Meanings of Levée en Masse’, ibid., 
pp. 85–101 and 299–312, agree with this position.
 26 On civilians, see U. Planert, Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg (Paderborn, 2007); idem, 
‘Staat und Krieg an der Wende zur Moderne: der deutsche Südwesten um 1800’, in W. 
Rösener, ed., Staat und Krieg: vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 
159–80; K.B. Aaslestad, ‘Lost Neutrality and Economic Warfare: Napoleonic Warfare in 
Northern Europe, 1795–1815’, in Chickering and Förster, War in an Age of Revolution, pp. 
373–94; idem, Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in 
North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden, 2005); idem, ‘War without Battles: 
Civilian Experiences of Economic Warfare during the Napoleonic Era in Hamburg’, in A. 
spontaneous popular rising as well as an act of conscription, with ‘the relentless imposition of 
the machinery of the bureaucratic state on hitherto seemingly unassailable hinterlands’, as 
Broers puts it – were characteristic of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, while Broers is 
more sceptical about a political dynamic, tending towards total engagement and the abandon-
ment of restraint.23
Partly in reaction to ‘national’ interpretations of the ‘wars of liberation’ and partly in 
response to Bell’s case about the revolutionary impact of warfare between 1792 and 
1815, which focuses above all on France but which has been extended – in modified 
form – to the rest of Europe and the United States through the work of Roger Chickering, 
Stig Förster, and others, recent historians of Germany have questioned whether the wars 
of the French Revolution and of Napoleon can be seen, in Ute Planert’s words, ‘as a 
caesura in world history’, bringing about ‘a fundamental change not only in the realm of 
politics but also in the nature of warfare’.24 In her opinion there are good reasons to doubt 
that ‘the path toward total warfare began at the end of the eighteenth century and the 
beginning of the nineteenth’, since it has proved possible to question ‘the importance of 
ideology’, the existence of
unlimited war aims that tend toward annihilation of the enemy, the development of unlimited 
destructive potential, the geographical expanse of military operations, the abandonment of 
moral and legal conventions, the deployment of mass armies, and the mobilization of civilian 
populations and economies for purposes of war.25
Planert, Katherine Aaslestad, and others have asked to what degree civilians – particularly 
but not only in south and west Germany, which are contrasted with a Prussian ‘exception’ 
– made a distinction between different sides and conceived of conflicts as patriotic or 
national struggles for survival and emancipation.26 They have also, together with other 
scholars such as Peter Brandt, Michael Sikora, and Jörg Echternkamp, challenged the idea 
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Forrest et al., eds, Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820 (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 118–36; idem 
and K. Hagemann, ‘1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in 
German Central European Historiography’, Central European History XXXIX (2006), pp. 
547–79; T.C.W. Blanning, The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance 
in the Rhineland, 1792–1802 (Oxford, 1983); M. Rowe, From Reich to State: The Rhineland 
in the Revolutionary Age, 1780–1830 (Cambridge, 2003); U. Andrea, Die Rheinländer, die 
Revolution und der Krieg 1794–1798 (Essen, 1994); G. Schuck, Rheinbundpatriotismus und 
politische Öffentlichkeit zwischen Aufklärung und Frühliberalismus: Kontinuitätsdenken 
und Diskontinuitätserfahrung in den Staatsrechts- und Verfassungsdebatten der 
Rheinbundspublizistik (Stuttgart, 1994); P. Sauer, Napoleons Adler über Württemberg, 
Baden und Hohenzollern: Südwestdeutschland in der Rheinbundzeit (Stuttgart, 1987); H. 
Berding, Napoleonische Herrschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik im Königsreich Westfalen 
1807–1813 (Göttingen, 1973); J. Engelbrecht, Das Herzogtum Berg im Zeitalter der 
Französischen Revolution: Modernisierungsprozesse zwischen bayerischem und französi-
schem Modell (Paderborn, 1996); M. Hamm, Die bayerische Integrationspolitik in Tirol 
1806–1814 (Munich, 1996). On so-called Prussian exceptionalism, see U. Frevert, A Nation 
in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (Oxford, 2004).
 27 On soldiers’ motivations, see J. Murken, Bayerische Soldaten im Russlandfeldzug 1812: 
ihre Kriegserfahrungen und deren Umdeutungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 
2006); P. Brandt, ‘Einstellungen, Motive und Ziele von Kriegsfreiwilligen 1813/14: 
das Freikorps Lützow’, in J. Dülffer, ed., Kriegsbereitschaft und Friedensordnung in 
Deutschland 1800–1814 (Münster, 1995), pp. 211–33, and idem, ‘Die Befreiungskriege 
von 1813 bis 1813 in der deutschen Geschichte’, in M. Grüttner et al., eds, Geschichte und 
Emanzipation (Frankfurt, 1999), pp. 17–57; J. Echternkamp, ‘“Teutschland, des Soldaten 
Vaterland”: die Nationalisierung des Krieges im frühen 19. Jahrhundert’, in W. Rösener, 
ed., Staat und Krieg: vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 181–203; 
M. Sikora, ‘Desertion und nationale Mobilmachung: militärische Verweigerung 1792–
1813’, in U. Broeckling and M. Sikora, eds, Armeen und ihre Deserteure: vernachlässigte 
Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit (Göttingen, 1998), pp. 112–40; K. Hagemann, 
‘Der “Bürger” als “Nationalkrieger”: Entwürfe von Militär, Nation und Männlichkeit in 
der Zeit der Freiheitskriege’, in idem and R. Pröve, eds, Landsknechte, Soldatenfrauen 
und Nationalkrieger: Militär, Krieg und Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel 
(Frankfurt, 1998), pp. 74–102.
 28 Planert, ‘Innovation or Evolution?’, pp. 70–1.
that soldiers were motivated by patriotic ideals, which had been believed to distinguish 
them from their eighteenth-century predecessors.27 ‘The master narrative of modern mili-
tary history’ has taken ‘insufficient note of lines of continuity to early modern times’ and 
has overlooked ‘differences between the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic wars 
themselves’, encouraging ‘a mistaken picture of developments during the nineteenth cen-
tury’, Planert continues: ‘From this perspective, the wars of the French Revolution fit in a 
long European tradition of state building by war that led from the early modern era to the 
nineteenth century.’28 According to such a reading of events, there are few, if any, grounds 
for discerning a fundamental or revolutionary change in the practices or consequences of 
warfare between 1792 and 1815.
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 30 A.W.A.N. v. Gneisenau, ‘Über den Krieg von 1806’, in Ausgewählte militärische Schriften, 
ed. G. Förster and C. Gudzent (East Berlin, 1984), p. 50.
 31 Ibid., pp. 50–1.
Here, I reassess contemporaries’ responses to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
in order to answer this underlying question about the existence and extent of a military 
revolution in the German lands. I argue, against the case made by Planert, that a funda-
mental shift occurred in the organization of armies and the waging of wars in Germany, 
with profound consequences for individual states and their subjects. There were many 
causes of the shift, but the creation of mass armies – examined in the third section – was 
decisive, bringing about changes in the ways in which wars were fought, experienced, 
represented, and perceived, and creating a common conception of unending, burdensome 
‘national’ or ‘participatory’ warfare, without which the post-revolutionary ‘peace’ and 
the return to smaller armies after 1815 are difficult to comprehend. The effects of mass 
conscription and warfare were multifarious, altering military and civilian leaders’ con-
ceptions of conflict and threatening – and in some cases bringing about – the demise of 
particular states. Politics and war seemed to many contemporaries to be closely con-
nected, raising questions about the national or patriotic purpose of military conflict.29 
The second section demonstrates, however, that the ‘patriotism’ of military and even 
civilian decision-makers in the German lands was a product of warfare – and sometimes 
an obstacle to it – rather than a cause, contrary to the claims made by Bell in respect of 
France. Many German officers remained critical of the allegedly patriotic or national 
motives of military reformers, but they nevertheless had to take them into account, imi-
tating French methods in order to be able to fight alongside or to defeat French armies in 
mobile, protracted, and bloody wars. The first section shows how such a conception of 
military conflicts differed from earlier eighteenth-century precedents.
I. From ‘Cabinet Wars’ to ‘Volkskriege’
In the wake of the battles of Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, reform-minded Prussian officers 
such as Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst and Hermann von Boyen regularly criti-
cized the old system, which they held to be partly responsible for the kingdom’s defeat. 
To August von Gneisenau, later quartermaster general and a staff officer of the Prussian 
commander Prince Friedrich Ludwig Hohenlohe in 1806, Berlin had failed to ‘awaken 
the common mood in Germany’ of ‘disgust against French oppression’, which could 
have created ‘a new Vendée’ for the Napoleonic regime; instead, it had maintained the 
separation of military and national affairs, allowing south Germans to remain disinter-
ested bystanders and obliging ‘only a fraction of the nation (Nation) to take up arms’.30 
The detachment of the army from civilian society was made worse by ‘our system of 
recruitment, with all its exemptions’, and Prussia’s long period of military service, which 
necessitated strict discipline to keep unwilling soldiers in check, but which also permit-
ted troops to marry, engendering homesickness and other burdens during long cam-
paigns.31 What was more, Prussia’s artillery and weapons were in a ‘poor state’, its many 
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 35 See N. Buschmann, C. Mick and I. Schierle, ‘Kriegstypen: Begriffsgeschichtliche Bilanz 
in deutschen, russischen und sowjetischen Lexika’, and F. Göse, ‘Kabinettskrieg’, in D. 
Beyrau et al., eds, Formen des Krieges (Paderborn, 2007), pp. 24–5, 121–47.
 36 C. v. Clausewitz to M. v. Brühl, 29 September 1806, cited in P. Paret, Clausewitz and the 
State, new edn (Princeton, NJ, 1985), p. 124.
soldiers were sent home untrained in accordance with an antiquated system of leave 
(Beurlaubungssystem), and its generals were marked out by their ‘incapacity’.32 The age 
of Duke Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand von Braunschweig, who had turned 71 on the eve of the 
battle of Auerstädt, left him with ‘the indecision so characteristic of his years’, aggra-
vated by the ‘disunity of the doyens of the General Staff’.33 ‘In summary, our self- 
conceit … does not let us keep up with the times,’ Gneisenau concluded.34 The impres-
sion which he and other reformers gave was that Prussia’s military system, widely 
thought to be the most advanced of its kind during the eighteenth century, had fallen 
behind the more flexible national system of France by the 1800s.
Prompted by French victories and the expansion of French power, it seemed, in the 
language of the time, that Fürstenkriege and Staatenkriege, or princely and state wars, 
had been superseded by Volkskriege, or wars of the people or nation.35 Later, in the mid-
nineteenth century, the term ‘cabinet war’ (Kabinettskrieg), which has subsequently been 
adopted by the majority of historians, came to describe the supposed shift from the regu-
lar, limited, aristocratic conflicts of the eighteenth century to momentous, unconstrained 
wars of ‘annihilation’ during and after the French Revolution. The term derived from the 
councils or cabinets of generals and ministers which were meant to guide the monarch as 
the nominal commander-in-chief of the army, and it became synonymous with the con-
cealed war aims, secret diplomacy, and self-serving nepotism of cliques of nobles sur-
rounding the ruler. Even in Prussia, where a noble warrior caste had been created over 
the previous century and a half as a functional, state-serving elite, the structure of com-
mand had become opaque, indecisive, and top-heavy, wrote the young officer Carl von 
Clausewitz to his fiancée on 29 September 1806, a fortnight before the battle of Jena. It 
was only possible to comprehend the difficulties facing Scharnhorst, his mentor and 
actual commander in 1806:
if one realizes that three commanders-in-chief and two chiefs of staff serve with the army, 
though only one commander and one chief of staff ought to be there … How much must the 
effectiveness of a gifted man be reduced when he is constantly confronted by obstacles of 
convenience and tradition, when he is paralyzed by constant friction with the opinions of 
others.36
With hindsight, cabinet wars seemed to have been characterized by relatively small stand-
ing armies, which had been deployed often but for specific purposes, as an extension of 
dynastic and commercial policy. Their use relied on the emergence of a more or less stable 
international order of consolidated states, within the ‘Westphalian system’ after 1648, and 
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those states’ gradual monopolization of violence at home during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. ‘The times are over’, remarked Helmuth von Moltke the Elder in his 
history of the Franco-German War of 1870–1, ‘when small armies of professional soldiers 
were deployed for dynastic ends, in order to conquer a city or a stretch of land, and then 
they returned to their winter quarters or signed a peace.’37 In effect, standing armies had 
become the instrument of dynastic states, or ‘absolutist’ ones, in the common nineteenth-
century cognate of ‘cabinet’, removing warfare, with its attendant risk of rebellion, from 
civilian (bürgerlich) life. Ideally, suggested Friedrich II, the civilian population should not 
notice that the state was at war at all.38
Reacting to the bloodletting of the Thirty Years War, which had combined the large-
scale combat and levels of killing of a religiously inspired civil war and the constant fight-
ing of a state of baronial anarchy, monarchs had harnessed the new potential of their 
centralizing states, tying aristocracies to the royal court, in the manner of Louis XIV, and 
to the officer corps of standing armies, which were used to quash opposition to royal 
power.39 Conflicts were frequent in the eighteenth century, occurring every two to three 
years on average and blurring the distinction between war and peace, but they were less 
bloody than in the early seventeenth century, with the warring parties relying on an estab-
lished system of great powers and a shared aristocratic code of honour to regulate conduct 
and bring wars to an end.40 Whereas states had failed to control the violence of noble 
retinues, popular revolt, and religious conflict in the century after 1559, they had managed 
to do so by a variety of means – most notably by increasing tax revenue, disbursing 
favours to a court aristocracy, expanding administration, and creating standing armies 
with noble officers and mercenary, foreign, or dragooned troops – after that point.41 Partly 
because of their domestic role as a police force and partly because of the cost of equip-
ment and, especially, replacement soldiers, standing armies seemed increasingly to have 
concentrated on manoeuvring, informed by the enlightened ‘science’ of warfare, and on 
protecting elaborate supply lines needed for a system of fortifications, sieges, artillery, 
and other weaponry, rather than on battles. ‘Why risk battle?’ the Duke of Braunschweig 
asked the French envoy from Paris, whose offer of the command of French forces in 
January 1792 he had just turned down in favour of a similar invitation from Prussia:
If the French are the victors it will ruin us; if they lose they will still have other resources. My 
plan is to move numerous armies into your border regions, station them there for an extended 
period, have them take up unassailable positions, and await your defeat from internal troubles 
and bankruptcy.42
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A great general, the official Saxon military manual of 1752 had declared, ‘shows his 
mastery by attaining the object of his campaign by sagacious and sure manoeuvres, with-
out incurring any loss’.43
On the battlefield itself, losses in the most important clashes had already diminished from 
approximately 15 per cent for the victor and 30 per cent for the vanquished during the Thirty 
Years War to 11 and 23 per cent respectively for the period between 1648 and 1715.44 Such 
losses continued to diminish up to and including the Wars of the Austrian Succession 
between 1740 and 1748, in which the fighting was less intense than during the Wars of the 
Grand Alliance (1689–97) and Spanish Succession (1701–14) – see Table 1. Friedrich II, 
who was famous for contravening many of the mantras of eighteenth-century warfare and 
forcing his opponents onto the battlefield, conceded that, ‘of the five battles which my 
troops have joined’, there were ‘only three which I had planned’.45 Even these battles, under 
the circumstances, he saw as a means of conserving men and supplies, asking in 1759 
‘whether it is not less dangerous to meet the enemy in battle and risk the danger of a small 
reverse’ than to face the losses, through disease, hunger, and desertion, of a prolonged 
campaign.46
Table 1. Severity and intensity of European and world wars.
Wars Dates Number of 
great powers
Countriesa Severityb Intensityc
Grand Alliance 1689–97 5 ABFNS 680 6,939
Spanish Succession 1701–14 5 ABFNS 1,251 12,490
Austrian Succession 1740–8 6 ABFPRS 359 3,379
Seven Years 1756–63 6 ABFPRS 992 9,118
French Revolutionary 1792–1802 5 ABFPR 663 5,816
Napoleonic 1803–15 5 ABFPR 1,869 16,112
All European wars 
(N=18)
1815–1913 3 or fewer A: 6; B: 1; 
F: 8; R: 5
Fewer 
than 217
Fewer 
than 1,743
First World 1914–18 8 ABFGIJRU 7,734 57,616
Second World 1939–45 7 BFGIJRU 12,948 93,665
aCountries participating in war: A, Austria; B, Britain; F, France; G, Germany; I, Italy; J, Japan; N, Nether-
lands; P, Prussia; R, Russia; S, Spain; U, United States.
bSeverity of war: total battle fatalities suffered by great powers, in thousands.
cIntensity of war: total battle fatalities suffered by great powers, per million European population.
Source: J.S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (Lexington, KY, 1983), p. 88.
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The costs and losses of eighteenth-century campaigns were still great, of course, 
comparable in many respects with those of earlier and later conflicts.47 In contrast to 
the seventeenth century, wars had become the preserve of the great powers in the 
Westphalian system, with Saxony, Bavaria, Sardinia, Venice, Naples, the Dutch 
Republic, and Savoy – and not the multitude of other small states – involved only as 
minor powers: Russia played a major part in 14 eighteenth-century wars; Austria and 
France, 12; Britain, 11; Prussia, 8; Turkey, 7; and the Dutch Republic and Naples, 
merely 2.48 Yet not all such conflicts were easily contained and, when they did 
escalate, they were likely to be bloody precisely because the great powers were 
involved. Furthermore, some wars concerned the very survival of states, as the first 
partition of Poland (1772) had proved, with the potential to break the precarious rules 
and practices of engagement. Most German contemporaries seem to have distin-
guished between major and minor wars, with the Thirty Years War and the Seven 
Years War their principal points of reference.49 Certainly officers, diplomats, minis-
ters, and rulers, those most responsible for the outbreak of wars, were guided by 
memories and myths of Friedrich II’s struggle for survival – or by Austria’s and 
Saxony’s confrontation with Prussia – between 1756 and 1763.
For Hermann von Boyen, later Prussian war minister (1814) and a member of the 
general staff in 1806, the problem during the 1790s and 1800s was the gradual disap-
pearance of the idiosyncratic but decisive generals ‘from the times of the Seven Years 
War’, such as his own commanding officer, who had barely been able to read and had 
given briefings in his kitchen, but who had ‘maintained a certain independence at 
grave moments, which can only be won by a profound inner education, not by social 
forms’.50 What would happen, Scharnhorst asked his audience at the Berlin Militärische 
Gesellschaft, which he had helped to found in 1802, ‘when the men Friedrich II trained 
during the Seven Years’ War are no longer with us?’51 To such officers, the Prussian 
king had risked everything in 1756 in a war for the existence of Prussia, countenancing 
battles, the massing of troops, rapid marches, looting, living off the land, the further 
professionalization of the officer corps, promotion of commoners, and fuller exploita-
tion of the cantonal system of conscription introduced in the 1730s. As a result, 
Prussia’s army had increased from 39,000 men in 1710 to 260,000 by 1760 (see Table 
2). The number of fatalities incurred in this perceived fight for survival was greater 
than that incurred in the Revolutionary Wars between 1792 and 1802 – 992,000 com-
pared with 663,000 – and the intensity of the fighting, or number of fatalities per head 
of population, was almost double that of the revolutionary conflicts. With its ‘geo-
graphical position and lack of natural and artificial defensive means’, it seemed to 
Scharnhorst in April 1806, ‘Prussia cannot wage a defensive war.’52 In such conditions 
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the risk, cost, and bloodshed of war could appear undiminished and the distinction 
between civilians and combatants tenuous.
The ‘taming’ of eighteenth-century warfare, particularly from the point of view of 
north German onlookers, was less salient than historians have claimed.53 Nonetheless, 
Prussian military reformers, most of whom emphasized the speed and all-or-nothing 
character of Friedrich II’s campaigns, also underlined the fact that the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars were different in kind from earlier conflicts as a consequence of 
changes introduced by French regimes. War seemed, in Clausewitz’s phrase, to have 
become ‘absolute’, transforming the significance of ideology, creating mass armies, giv-
ing a greater role to conscripts and public opinion, mobilizing civilian populations and 
economies, promoting unlimited war aims and wars of ‘annihilation’ (Vernichtung), and 
compromising moral and legal conventions.54 Scharnhorst, who had transferred to the 
Prussian army from Hanover in 1801 and became the principal military reformer after 
1806, had already indicated in his well-known essay ‘The Development of the General 
Causes of the Good Fortune of the French in the Revolutionary War’ of 1797 that the 
Table 2. Armed forces numbers in thousands during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
Country Late 17th 
century
Early 18th 
century
Mid-18th century Late 18th century
Habsburg 
monarchy
50 (1690) 100 (1705)
100–40 (1710)
157–201 (1756)
202 (1760)
312 (1786)
Prussia 30 (1688) 40 (1713) 143 (1756)
260 (1760)
160 (1778)
194 (1786)
France 130 (1679)
338 (1690)
400 (1703)
300–60 (1710)
330 (1756)
280 (1760)
156 (1786)
800 (1794)
Russia 200 (1680) 220 (1710) 284–344 (1756) 200 (1778)
300 (1796)
Great Britain 
and Ireland
80 (1690) 139 (1710) 62 (1739–48)
93 (1756–63)
100–8 (1775–83)
800 (1803)
Sweden 90 (1690) 110 (1709) 53 45
Dutch Republic 73 (1690) 100 (1710) 39 (1756)  
Spain 40 (1703) 56 (1759) 140 (1803)
Source: J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800 (Basingstoke, 1991), p. 
7; W. Demel, Europäische Geschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 2000).
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neighbouring state’s victories had not been fortuitous: ‘The source of the misfortune 
which struck the allied powers in the French revolutionary war must be deeply interwo-
ven with its internal relationships and with those of the French nation.’55 Tellingly he 
began with the soldiers’ new-found, nationally inspired motivation to wage war and 
ended with questions of military tactics and leadership, as if the former had informed or 
even produced the latter. In 1807 Scharnhorst was made the chair of the Military 
Reorganization Commission, created by Friedrich Wilhelm III to investigate every 
capitulation and to receive reports from every senior officer implicated in Prussia’s 
defeat. Five of the commission’s six members – by the end of 1807 – were in favour of 
thoroughgoing change, encouraged by the king’s ‘Guidelines for the Reorganization of 
the Army’, drafted in July 1807, which had confirmed that ‘it will neither be feasible nor 
advisable, after the experiences we have had until now, to put the army completely on its 
old footing after its rebirth’.56
Many Prussian officers, however, were opposed. It was ‘not to be doubted that our 
officers still dream (“think” would be to say too much) of a great army on the old footing, 
and the propertied, the merchant and the farmer can pay and suffer’, wrote Barthold 
Georg Niebuhr in a letter to Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein in 1813: ‘Each 
limitation is an assault (so says von Kalckreuth).’57 Initially, Friedrich Wilhelm III had 
appointed three of his own adjutants to the commission, plus another similarly minded 
officer, to create a conservative majority, which was only averted by Scharnhorst’s sub-
sequent manoeuvring.58 Lieutenant General Julius von Grawert, who was later appointed 
to command the Prussian forces in the Grande Armée in 1812, and whose division had 
been slaughtered at Jena in 1806 while using the traditional tactic of advancing slowly 
and volley by volley, wrote to the king from Breslau in September 1807 that ‘the renown 
which the Prussian army had fought for in the whole of Europe during the Seven Years 
War’ had only been lost through the softening of the army during too long a peace and by 
‘the unfortunate revolution in France’, which had nurtured ideas, ‘especially among the 
civilian orders (Zivilstände)’, which ‘threatened to overthrow every previously existing 
order and constitution (Verfassung)’.59 Correctives put forward by Grawert included 
emergency relief for impoverished officers who had been falsely accused of a dereliction 
of duty in 1806, measures against ‘immorality’, such as the establishment of workhouses, 
and putting any ‘burgher’ who impugned the honour of an officer in chains.60 Other 
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Prussian officers were more moderate, but remained cautious. Prince August, for 
instance, submitted a memorandum in June 1807, while still a prisoner of war in France, 
which backed Scharnhorst’s proposal to combine infantry, cavalry, and artillery in sepa-
rate divisions, improving their coordination, and which called for greater speed, partly by 
relieving soldiers of heavy equipment, better use of sharpshooters – a Prussian invention 
– and a more flexible system of supply. He also demanded tactical alterations, most nota-
bly ‘an intelligent combination of line with light infantry’ which ‘the French were the 
first to carry out … on a large scale’, securing ‘important advantages’, but he stopped 
short of fundamental ‘French’ innovations which required greater independence and 
motivation on the part of nationally inspired troops: ‘In modern times one generally can-
not expect great results from patriotism … In nearly all contemporary wars, love of hon-
our and ambition have been a greater influence and have often replaced enthusiasm or 
patriotism.’61
In Vienna, Archduke Karl had arrived at a similar conclusion a decade earlier, in his 
treatise On War against the New Franks (1795). ‘How was it possible that a well-
equipped, balanced, disciplined army had been defeated by an enemy with raw troops, 
lacking cavalry, and with inexperienced generals?’ His answer, like August’s, concen-
trated narrowly on strategic and tactical questions: Austria had fought a defensive war, it 
had been preoccupied with its lines of supply, and it had fragmented and dispersed its 
forces in an easily punctured cordon of defence.62 Although aware of military reforms 
carried out by Austria after defeat in 1805, officers and ministers in other German states 
had fewer reasons and less opportunity, given the swingeing nature of French demands 
for money and troops from its allies in the Confederation of the Rhine, to implement 
changes on the Prussian model. Patriotism – or loyalty to a particular state – existed 
within a narrow reading public and beyond, but it was of limited significance for the 
reform of German armies.
II. Patriotism and Its Limits
The transformation of the German armies which occurred in the 1800s and 1810s was at 
once part of a broader movement of reform and a direct response to the changing impera-
tives of combat.63 More and more soldiers entered the army and the relationship between 
civilian – particularly urban – society and the military became closer, at the same time as 
military institutions, codes, and traditions were collapsing or were being replaced. These 
developments were accompanied in Prussia after 1806 and Bavaria after 1813 by debates 
within the military and the state about the necessity of a ‘patriotic’ reorganization of the 
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army. To Prussian reformers such as Scharnhorst, the allies had lost and France had won 
primarily because the French had been more motivated than their opponents. ‘The strug-
gle was indeed too unequal: one side had everything to lose, the other little,’ he had writ-
ten in 1797.64 French soldiers, as well as officers, had believed in 1792 that they were 
threatened with subjugation and the disappearance of the state at the hands of their 
enemies, which pushed civilians and combatants to make extraordinary sacrifices. This 
sense of fighting for survival had combined with the desire for a free society and with a 
longer-standing national pride – ‘The French nation has always deemed itself to be the 
only people which is enlightened, intelligent, free and happy, despising all other nations 
as uncultured, bestial and wretched’ – to create a new type of soldier and, as a corollary, 
new forms of combat: ‘the reasons for the defeat of the allied powers must be deeply 
enmeshed in their internal conditions and in those of the French nation.’65
When war recommenced on the Continent in 1805–6, the allies demonstrated that 
they had still not learned their lesson. Prussia had treated the conflict ‘like an autumn 
manoeuvre’, averred Scharnhorst from Hamburg on 13 November 1806:
I was the only one who knew all the different parts of the great military machine, but I was 
transferred to Hanover with a small corps, as quartermaster general, and only then, when they 
could not help themselves, did I come to a larger army.66
Prussian soldiers and civilians had not realized, despite the revolutionary changes which 
had occurred in France in the 1790s, that they were fighting a ‘national’ war of survival:
It was a great misfortune that no one knew that everything was in play – the indifference of the 
milieu of the king and of the king himself often made me melancholic, and often vexed, to the 
highest degree. Eight weeks before the outbreak of war, I sent a memorandum to the king and 
asked him for the general arming of militarily capable men, up to a 300,000-strong national 
militia (Nationalmilitz).67
Six and a half years later, in a memorandum for Hardenberg of April 1813, Scharnhorst 
remained more convinced than ever that ‘only an arrangement which employs the entire 
strength of the nation (die Gesamtkräfte der Nation) can secure the throne and our 
independence’:
To entrust the security of the king and national independence to a standing army alone is always 
dangerous, especially against an opponent such as ours is, which stands before us, which risks 
everything in order to win everything. If chance should decide against us in a few battles, it will 
destroy us, insofar as we do not now muster the entirety of our national forces against it. 
Without such a development of all the institutions of defence available to us, which does not 
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merely mean the standing army but also the physical and moral resources of the nation, we 
cannot vouch for success. On the other hand, if this development of our armed forces 
(Streitkräfte) in their full extent takes place, then we will never again be completely knocked 
down, and the operations of our armies can therefore be carried out with greater security.68
By the end of 1813, Prussian and Bavarian leaders were able to cast their armies in a patri-
otic light. Unlike other Rheinbund states, Bavaria concluded an alliance with the Coalition 
nine days before the battle of Leipzig, on 8 October, and its actions were justified by Max 
Joseph in patriotic and national terms for the well-being of the kingdom and in the name of 
‘German’ culture.69 About 6,000 volunteer soldiers and 230 volunteer officers eventually 
came forward, funded by ‘patriotic’ donations.70 In this respect the experiences of the 
Bavarian government and army were closer to those of Prussia, which had used the reverses 
of 1806 to increase the motivation, independence, and mobility of its soldiers. The signifi-
cance of such state ‘patriotism’ – not to mention German nationalism – varied, of course, with 
even Bavaria failing to enforce conscription in the newly annexed Tyrol after 1808–9 and 
with its internal troops arresting 7,800 Bavarian deserters and 5,100 fleeing conscripts, 
together with 43,500 ‘foreign’ deserters, out of a total of 270,000 people arrested, between 
1806 and 1815.71 Likewise, Prussian authorities found it difficult to enlist conscripts in cities 
such as Berlin and Potsdam and in annexed or border regions such as Westphalia, Silesia, and 
its Polish provinces. In 1813, 631 out of 2,800 soldiers in the Prussian Landwehr of the dis-
trict of Münster deserted, yielding a figure – 22.4 per cent – in excess of the French desertion 
rate of 10 per cent between 1803 and 1814 or that of the German-speaking territories of the 
left bank of the Rhine, annexed by and subjected to the conscription of France, where 14 per 
cent of recruits, or 5,000 out of 35,000, deserted between 1801 and 1810.72
In the Prussian and Bavarian heartlands, however, desertion was much rarer, in spite of 
the makeshift nature of the two states between 1806 and 1815 and increasing levels of 
conscription, with Berlin doubling the size of its forces through the creation of the Landwehr 
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in 1813 and with Munich disposing of 50,000 troops in October 1813, including 10,000 in 
the National Guard, and 60,000 in April 1815.73 Although ‘desertion’ – which had been 
redefined by extension (articles 1 and 6) as state ‘treason’ in the revised military code of 
1808 rather than as an internal army matter – was endemic in the Prussian Lützower corps 
of volunteers, comprising 15 per cent of all troops and 25 per cent of infantrymen, as edu-
cated or prosperous idealists and a mixed group of other combatants experienced the reali-
ties of a campaign, the desertion rate for Prussia’s Freiwillige as a whole – from 8,000 
troops by June 1813 and 30,000 by mid-1814 – was low, at between 1 and 5 per cent.74 
Notwithstanding much higher levels of recruitment, fewer exemptions, the transitional 
character of military and state institutions, and the changing meaning of ‘desertion’, which 
now included the flight of young men before actual enlistment, average rates of desertion 
in Prussia, Bavaria, and elsewhere in Germany in the 1800s and 1810s were lower than in 
the eighteenth century. During the last phase of its old system, Prussia had experienced 
9,500 desertions in the mobilization of 1805 and the short campaign of 1806 alone.75
Many contemporaries doubted the conversion of Prussian and other German officers 
to a patriotic cause. Certainly, the contortions and realignments of their princes had 
shown that military loyalty to a particular ruler or dynasty was conditional, occasionally 
overridden by a conception of the state or even Volk and its interests, as Clausewitz 
spelled out in his ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’ in February 1812, which sought to justify his 
decision to fight on Russia’s side against Prussia:
I believe and profess that a Volk can acknowledge nothing higher than the worth and freedom 
of its own existence …, that the honour of the king and government is one with the honour of 
the Volk and the sole safeguard of its well-being.76
After the Prussian king had signed an alliance with France in the same month, about a 
quarter of Prussian officers had resigned from their commissions.77 Yet their preoccupa-
tions seem to have been military ones, comprehensible only in the context of the near 
collapse of the Prussian army. As Clausewitz revealed in 1813, in an essay comparing 
1813 with 1806, even the most entrenched institutions and practices in Prussia had been 
shown by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to be flimsy:
In the unfortunate days of Jena and Auerstädt, the Prussian army lost its glory; in the retreat it 
fell apart. Its fortresses were given up, the state was conquered, and after four weeks of fighting 
little was left of either state or army … The [armistice] completed the misery … Within a year, 
Prussia’s glittering military state, a joy to all lovers of soldiers and war, had disappeared. 
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Admiration was replaced by reproach and censure, homage often by humiliation. An oppressive 
sadness weighed on the army’s morale. Finding confidence in the past was not possible; nor 
was hope for the future. Even that ultimate source for regaining courage, trust in particular 
leaders, was absent, because in the brief war no one had achieved prominence, and the few who 
had distinguished themselves were divided among factions holding different opinions.78
Having been captured in the ‘various capitulations’ of 1806 and then released, ‘a great 
number of officers’, wrote Julius von Grawert in September 1807, had been obliged to ‘go 
back to the provinces’ and, receiving nothing from the state, ‘had to seek out a means of 
living, helplessly, for many months, without any support’.79 Some soldiers had fled with 
Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher towards Lübeck or with the king and much of the general 
staff towards Silesia and East Prussia; others were captured and sent home, or – like 
Boyen – evaded capture and made their way back to Prussia clandestinely.80 The impres-
sion which such insiders give is of an army – or ‘remnants of an army’, in Boyen’s phrase 
– close to dissolution.81 The subsequent reform of the Prussian army, including the intro-
duction of a more humane disciplinary code (Kriegsartikeln) in 1808 and support, in the 
same year, for promotion according to talent and education (in reorganized military acad-
emies), took place against this background. Some observers, like the Austrian envoy in 
Breslau, where Prussian military reformers were plotting the coming war against France 
at the start of 1813, believed that ‘the military and the heads of different sects’ had ‘taken 
complete control of the reins of government’ merely ‘under the mask of patriotism’.82
Many officers, confronted by the need to reform existing practices, found themselves 
in the company of uncomfortable bedfellows. August von Gneisenau, writing to Friedrich 
Wilhelm III to resign his duties on the Military Reorganization Commission, complained 
that ‘the necessary innovations in the army weigh us down with the hatred of all those 
who are bound, through habit or interest, to the old things’.83 Ludwig Yorck von 
Wartenburg – who continued to work with Stein in 1813 in spite of rejoicing at his dis-
missal, as a chance of controlling ‘mad heads’ and removing ‘nests of vipers’, in 
November 1808 – was in favour both of radical measures such as the arming of a 
Landwehr in 1810–11 and of maintaining preferential noble access to commissions in the 
army, as an ‘older privilege of the class that had borne this duty’.84 He also favoured 
serfdom, ‘that so-called slavery of the peasants etc.’, opposition to which was ‘nothing 
but philanthropic babbling’.85 Other officers, especially those from the Rheinbund states 
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but also the ‘French party’ in Prussia, were forced to adapt to the demands and military 
conventions of their French overlord. Baden’s ‘Anschluss with France’ in 1805 had 
necessitated the dispatching of a corps of 3,000 troops to the French army, which was 
about to attack Austria, provoking several officers to resign and leaving the rank and file, 
who had been issued with French painted flags just before their departure, feeling ‘that 
they had been sold out to France’.86
As a result, ‘desertion gained ground in a shocking fashion’.87 Keeping their uni-
forms, which meant that they were occasionally shot at by their allies as ‘Prussians’, 
Badenese units subsequently fought alongside French ones, sometimes under direct 
French command, against Prussia in 1806 (8,000 troops), in Spain in 1808, against the 
Habsburg monarchy in 1809 (6,000 troops), as part of the Grande Armée in Russia in 
1812 (6,766 troops), and against Prussia, Austria, and Russia in 1813.88 In disarray, with 
soldiers ‘very inadequately equipped’ and an officer corps depending on ‘Fremde’ – 
mainly from Kurhessen – ‘because of the rapid expansion of our troops in this country’, 
the Badenese army was bound, especially in 1806, to toe the French line.89 Although the 
army had been consolidated between 1807 and 1811, and acquitted itself well in 1809, it 
was destroyed in 1812, which forced Karlsruhe to rebuild it. ‘The impression which I 
received was not the most favourable,’ recalled the grand duke’s brother in August 1813: 
‘The three battalions were composed of raw, very young soldiers who had scarcely been 
in the service for three months; there was a great lack of officers and, especially, NCOs.’90 
The cavalry units which joined the Badenese infantry in Saxony had only just received 
horses and they ‘could barely stay on them’, presenting ‘a pitiful picture’ to their peers.91 
The same was true of other German armies.92
The tutelage rather than enmity of France in many German lands makes it difficult to 
compare the metamorphosis of the armies of the medium-sized and smaller Rheinbund 
states with that of Prussia or the Habsburg monarchy. There were attempts, before 1806, 
to awaken patriotic sentiments in newly expanded states such as Baden, Württemberg, 
and Bavaria, of which laws of recruitment to the army were part. In Karlsruhe a decree 
of 23 March 1804, though perpetuating many exemptions, restated subjects’ duty to 
serve in the militia and defined recruiting cantons along Prussian lines. A cadet school 
for officers was established in Ludwigsburg the following year. In Stuttgart the law of 
1803, which had first mooted general conscription, was replaced by a law on 6 August 
1806 which purported to bring such conscription into effect, albeit with familiar exclu-
sions for the nobility, officials, state industries, well-to-do merchants, and only sons. 
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Having improved the system for replacing troops and having carried out manoeuvres in 
1806, King Friedrich of Württemberg was able to raise an army of 8,000 troops and 
3,500 reserves for the war against Prussia in the autumn of 1806 with little difficulty. As 
his army departed for Saxony, the monarch made an emphatic appeal for it to honour its 
king and fatherland.93 In Munich, Max Joseph’s call for support arguably derived from 
more reliable sources, drawing on anti-Austrian sentiment and popular acclamation, 
which had been evident at the time of his coronation as the first King of Bavaria on 
1 January 1806.94 The ‘General Reglement on the Expansion of the Electorate’s Army’ 
on 30 April 1804 had brought to an end Bavaria’s reliance on mercenaries. It was sup-
plemented by the establishment of military cantons on 7 January 1805 and a declaration 
that it was the duty of every fit male subject between 16 and 40 years of age to serve in 
the military. Substitutions were still allowed and exemptions persisted, but the exclusion 
of foreigners and a formal oath to the elector had created a fundamentally new concep-
tion of a specifically ‘Bavarian’ army.95
The idea of ‘patriotic’ or ‘state’ armies rather than the mercenary standing armies of 
princes could initially be held to be compatible with the close and one-sided alliances of 
the various states with France, not least because Napoleon Bonaparte enjoyed consider-
able support in southern and central Germany as a harbinger of peace and an enemy of 
the old order.96 Over time, however, the Napoleonic Wars seemed to sever the connection 
between the states’ armies and Bavarian, Saxon, Swabian, or Badenese patriotism.97 The 
newly anointed monarchs and dukes of the Confederation of the Rhine, with their 
expanding territories and growing populations, remained beholden to the French emperor. 
As early as 1799 Max Joseph, on becoming elector, had professed his loyalty to the 
Directory, partly to expel occupying Austrian forces, massing to attack France, and partly 
as a scion – and former Duke of Zweibrücken – of the western German outpost of the 
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Palatinate, which had provided Bavaria with its ruling dynasty in 1777: ‘I was born in 
France, I beg you to take me for a Frenchman … After every victory of the French army 
I have felt myself to be a Frenchman.’98 By 1806, though, the new king was already 
fulminating against his envoy in Paris, who had been forced by the French, ‘against his 
instructions’, to sign too compromising a set of acts of confederation. ‘If he had come 
within my sight, I would have put a bullet in his head,’ threatened the monarch: ‘The evil 
has happened. It is no longer to be prevented, notably because of the peace with Russia 
and because we have 150,000 Frenchmen in the country.’99
The war of 1809 against the Habsburg monarchy divided the Bavarian population, 
with some Catholics supporting Vienna, and it destroyed the Bavarian army, with its best 
division losing 3,600 soldiers, or 60 per cent of its total, at Wagram on 5–6 July 1809 – 
the largest battle up to that point, involving 340,000 combatants.100 The invasion of 
Russia in 1812 proved much worse, with Bavarian divisions split up and some regiments 
put under direct French command, which led the first minister, Maximilian von 
Montgelas, to complain of ‘the most damaging influence’ of the ‘separation’ on ‘the 
morale of troops used to serving together’.101 The same troops had then marched all the 
way to Moscow and back again, with about 9 per cent of soldiers, or 3,200 out of 35,799, 
returning to Bavaria alive. ‘The campaign which has just finished has cost the army of 
the king 30,000 men, of which enemy fire has killed the smaller part,’ wrote Montgelas 
in February 1813: ‘The greater part has succumbed to the cold, to hunger, and to the 
misery which is to be found at the hands of the enemy.’102 King Max Joseph complained 
to Napoleon that the monarchy was barely able to continue: ‘It is not the vertigo and the 
discontentment of the people, it is the exhaustion of the resources of the government 
which is giving me serious cause for concern.’103 Nevertheless, he had little choice, given 
his – and his Rheinbund neighbours’ – earlier decisions, but to remain in the French camp 
until the eve of the battle of Leipzig in October 1813.104
Baden and Württemberg were in a weaker position than Bavaria. The government 
in Karlsruhe had had to build an army virtually from scratch after the turn of the cen-
tury, having gone to war against Prussia in 1806 with a cavalry without horses and an 
infantry with looted guns and the wrong sort of ammunition.105 On grounds 
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of ‘cleanliness and comfort’, soldiers were no longer required to wear – and powder 
– wigs.106 Crown Prince Karl, who had shortly beforehand been forced into a marriage 
with Napoleon’s adopted daughter Stéphanie de Beauharnais, had been put in charge 
of the Badenese forces, but he had been heavily criticized by the French and distanced 
from the troops. Even his own subordinate officer, Valentin von Harrant, had avowed 
that ‘it would have been better, on the whole, if the prince had stayed at home’.107 By 
comparison with that of its western neighbour, Württemberg’s army had performed 
well in both 1806 and 1809, but it had done so under the direct command of the French 
general Dominique Vandamme against the wishes of King Friedrich, since it had been 
deemed too small to stand on its own.108
In 1812, in order to avoid the imposition of another French general, Crown Prince 
Friedrich Wilhelm was chosen by the monarch to command the state’s contingent, but 
he was soon being accused by Napoleon, whom – his father was sure – he hated, of 
fomenting revolt. King Friedrich wrote to caution him that ‘I was put in a position to 
found the state, of which you should one day be the ruler, by him [Napoleon] alone.’109 
In a similar fashion, 20-year-old Graf Wilhelm von Hochberg, the grand duke’s younger 
brother, was put in charge of Badenese troops in 1812, yet his presence did not prevent 
the contingent being incorporated into the Third Army Corps under Marshal Michel 
Ney. Only 800–1,000 soldiers from Baden’s contingent of 7,166 and 387 or so from 
Württemberg’s force of 15,800 returned from Russia, contradicting, in the most dam-
aging way, King Friedrich’s earlier prediction, in 1809, that ‘We are with Caesar, and 
everything will go well.’110 Although the monarch was aware, as he wrote to his for-
eign minister at the start of 1813, that ‘displeasure’ was increasing daily in Stuttgart 
and in the countryside ‘with everything that is French’, and that ‘calls to the people are 
being made, in different places, … in which a freeing from the yoke with the help of 
Austria is spoken of’, he was obliged to continue to assure Napoleon, despite the dif-
ficulties which he encountered in raising a new army for the campaign of 1813, that he 
had done everything possible to fulfil his treaty obligations to France over the previous 
eight years.111 Grand Duke Karl of Baden was even more explicit, as he wrote to 
Napoleon – his father-in-law – in January 1813: ‘My greatest ambition consists, as a 
consequence of my eagerness and my unchanging subjection, in gaining the support of 
Your Majesty.’112 A month later he went on:
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I, who am bound by the sweetest and holiest ties to the great fortune of Your Majesty and of the 
house founded by you, am fully convinced of the necessity that all the allied states will also, for 
their part, make those efforts which the circumstances demand of them.113
It was more and more difficult for such rulers and their governments, confronted by 
popular scepticism and resistance, to pretend that their armies had a patriotic 
purpose.
The transfer of the states and armies of the Confederation of the Rhine to the 
Coalition against Napoleon in the autumn of 1813 proved to be painful for many of 
the participants, particularly officers and officials, and it was rarely accompanied by 
expressions of patriotic or ‘German’ feeling. Wilhelm, the commander of the Badenese 
contingent still trapped in Leipzig in mid-October, gave a vivid account of the travails 
of the remaining regimes allied to France. Having been told by Napoleon, whose 
forces had left the city on 19 October, that he no longer enjoyed French protection, the 
King of Saxony had already begun to negotiate with the Crown Prince of Sweden, 
who was acting on behalf of the Coalition, when he heard a ‘vivat’ outside the build-
ing in which the talks were taking place. Thinking that it might be for Napoleon, the 
monarch went into the square to witness a crowd rejoicing at the arrival of Tsar 
Alexander: ‘With sadness’, recorded Wilhelm, ‘I noticed how no one made way for 
the worthy old gentleman, who was now abandoned by everyone, after fortune had 
turned against him.’114 The tsar, ignorant of the King of Saxony’s presence, acknowl-
edged the crowd and left the square with the crown prince, who had not bothered to 
tell him of the Saxon monarch’s plight. ‘I shall never forget the impressions which 
this day left me with,’ wrote the later Margrave of Baden, having observed the 
Habsburg Kaiser ride into the market square, to a vivat from the Badenese troops, 
‘many of whom were former [Austrian] subjects’:
In the morning, I saw Emperor Napoleon and his army, made up of so many different parts, 
withdraw, and now I was confronted by the same colourful picture of diverse nations and 
peoples (Völkerschaften), as I viewed the allied army.115
Cut off from the French forces but without orders to switch sides from Karlsruhe, ‘whose 
situation’ was ‘very difficult because of the proximity of the French border’, Wilhelm 
surrendered and was taken prisoner by the Prussian army, which also took control of the 
Badenese soldiers.116 On 21 October he had an audience with the King of Prussia, who 
assured him that he understood ‘the painful situation of the grand duke fully and [under-
stood] that other states, too, [had] recently been in the same position, and he would, 
therefore, ensure that all possible allowances were made’.117 
On returning to Baden in December 1813, Wilhelm found that ‘the mood’ was an 
‘unusual’ one:
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One was ill-disposed to anything French in its entirety, but people did not really trust themselves 
to voice their opinion, partly out of fear of a further turn in the fortunes of war, partly out of 
shame in front of the Grand Duchess. Everything which had to take place did so, therefore, but 
without enthusiasm for the so-called German business.118
The government and army of Württemberg were in a similar predicament, caught after 
8 October, as King Friedrich explained in a letter to Napoleon, between an advancing 
Bavarian and Austrian army and a retreating French one. Friedrich’s decision to declare 
his state’s neutrality did not mean, he assured the emperor, that his feelings had changed, 
‘but my steps have to be guided by unchangeable necessities’.119 As in Baden, the king’s 
decision seems to have produced mixed feelings among Württemberg’s soldiers and to 
have met with few public expressions of patriotic sentiment, even though the very contor-
tions of the governments of the Rheinbund states betrayed a perceived need, which occa-
sioned increasing discomfort, to cast their participation in the Napoleonic Wars in a 
patriotic light. The principal changes had been forced on the German states, most of which 
had been required to fit into Napoleon’s military system. In former ecclesiastical 
territories, small principalities, and city states, this meant the imposition of military ser-
vice for the first time.120 The next section assesses the extent to which they, along with the 
larger German states, managed to reform and expand their armies, with – potentially, at 
least – profound consequences for the place of the military in the German lands.
III. The Levée en Masse and Conscription
The French levée en masse challenged contemporary assumptions about warfare. 
Although it failed to recruit more than half the cohort – even in 1794 – and later was 
restricted by Napoleon through the reintroduction of ‘substitution’ and preferment for the 
propertied classes, the system had allowed the mobilization of 750,000–800,000 men 
(1794), after the National Convention had introduced conscription for an additional 
300,000 soldiers in February 1793, of whom about 75,000 were sent to fight in the 
Vendée. The French army in 1789 had numbered 180,000, but it had since shrunk as a 
result of desertion, the departure of foreign troops, and the flight of 60 per cent of active 
officers – 6,000 – into exile by the end of 1791.
The 80,000 or so Prussians, Austrians, Hessians, and émigrés who had crossed the 
French border in mid-August 1792 had met little resistance, and took the fortress of 
Verdun, the last major defence before Paris, on 2 September. The initial plan, drafted in 
Potsdam in May, had been for a force of 42,000 Prussians to enter France through 
Luxembourg, with 56,000 Austrians entering through Belgium on its right flank, and 
about 20,000 Austrians attacking from the Breisgau – of a total force there of 50,000 – on 
its left flank. It had been scaled down as a consequence of internal squabbling, with 
Vienna and Berlin not wanting to do the other’s bidding, but also because of the 
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Coalition’s confidence that a smaller army would suffice to capture French fortresses, 
which was the military planners’ main concern. The allies were shocked, therefore, to be 
stopped by a superior number of French troops under General Charles François 
Dumouriez – 64,000, including reserves, against the allies’ 34,000, depleted by dysen-
tery – at Valmy on 20 September.121 As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who witnessed the 
battle, recorded at a much later date, ‘the French could not be shifted’:
The greatest consternation spread through the army. Only that morning all they had had in mind 
was skewering the French and eating them for breakfast. Indeed, it was this unconditional 
confidence in this army and its commander [the Duke of Braunschweig] which had seduced me 
into joining this perilous expedition. But now everyone kept his own counsel, did not meet the 
eyes of his comrades, and if he did give tongue, it was only to curse or complain.122
Whether or not Goethe’s claim that he had foreseen the beginning of ‘a new epoch in the 
history of the world’ was coloured by later events, Valmy at once reversed the allied 
advance and demonstrated the effectiveness of the rapidly recruited French volunteers, 
who had been described by The Times as ‘a very motley group’, with ‘almost as many 
women as men, many without arms, and [with] very little provision’.123 Some 100,000 
such volunteers had already reached the front by the spring of 1792, when war had been 
declared.124 The French army, having swollen to approximately 450,000 by autumn of 
1792, fell to 350,000 by the start of 1793, from whom a total of about 220,000 were 
‘effectives’.125 Such forces far outnumbered those of the Coalition.
The allies quickly recognized the value of France’s numerical superiority, especially 
when combined with the patriotism of its soldiers, even if many allied leaders refused to 
accept the consequences of French levies and conscription.126 A Prussian observer 
reported from Valmy:
The volunteers were not as straight as a die, as were the Prussians, and were not as polished, 
well-trained or skilled in handling a gun or marching in step; nor did they know how to 
tighten their belts around their tunics as the Prussians did, yet they were devoted to the cause 
they served in body and soul. Nearly all those I encountered at that time knew for whom and 
for what they were fighting and declared that they were ready to die for the good of their 
patrie.127
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The poor training and equipment of French troops, the difficulties of integrating volun-
teers in the standing army of the ancien régime and of coordinating new divisions – usu-
ally only 5,000 or so strong instead of the intended 15,000 – meant that revolutionary 
armies often lost when their numbers were equal, but they won when they enjoyed a 
numerical advantage, which they regularly did. As a consequence of poor training and 
inexperience, revolutionary armies were less consistently victorious than Napoleonic 
ones, losing at Neerwinden in March 1792, Mainz in July 1793, and Kaiserslautern three 
times in 1793–4, but also – critically – winning at Valmy, Jemappes in November 1792, 
and Fleurus in June 1794, so that France’s wars were, after 1792, conducted abroad 
rather than at home. Wilhelm, one of the margrave’s sons, recounted that in the border 
region of Baden the 1790s had been characterized by flight from, and fear of, approach-
ing armies, usually – in 1793, 1796, and 1799 – French ones.128 The early threat of defeat 
in 1792 seemed to have galvanized the French population and its revolutionary govern-
ment, altering war planners’ expectations of combat. In 1797 Scharnhorst wrote:
The terrible position the French found themselves in, surrounded by several armies which 
sought (or so they believed) to enslave and condemn them to eternal misery, inspired the soldier 
with courage, induced the citizen to make voluntary sacrifices, gathered supplies for the army 
and attracted the civilian population to the colours.129
In a defensive and patriotic war, France had been able to recruit greater numbers of 
troops than its opponents, which – despite the initial scepticism of allied commanders – 
had gone on to make a decisive difference in the Revolutionary Wars. ‘Reduced to the 
defensive, we are continually harassed on two flanks of our positions in Flanders and on 
the Sambre by innumerable hordes who are in fact constantly defeated and repulsed,’ 
lamented the Austrian leader Franz Maria von Thugut in 1794, ‘but our army is vastly 
weakened by these partial victories while the enemy repairs its losses with the greatest 
ease.’130 Although Bonaparte’s later boast that he could afford 30,000 casualties per bat-
tle was an exaggeration, with the republican army’s notional strength of 434,235 in 1799 
concealing a deployable force of 181,000 once allied, interior, expeditionary, and absent 
troops had been subtracted, France certainly proved able in the 1790s and 1800s to field 
and replace a larger number of soldiers than its enemies.
German states’ reactions to the levée en masse were tardy and disparate.131 Prussia 
had ended its war with France through the Peace of Basle on 16 May 1795 and had done 
little to reform its army before defeat at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806. The majority of 
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middling and small states, although formally at war under the aegis of the Holy Roman 
Empire with its contingent of 40,000, continued to maintain smaller armies in the 1790s 
than they had had in 1700 (Table 3). Attempts to introduce conscription and to organize 
militias failed.132 Principalities such as the electorates of Mainz and Cologne, with their 
‘armies’ of 3,000 and 1,700 respectively, were mocked by Prussian observers for provid-
ing soldiers suitable merely for accompanying Corpus Christi processions.133 Vienna’s 
main response to France before defeat at Austerlitz on 2 December 1805, given that the 
cantonal system introduced by Joseph II in 1786 remained a dead letter because of 
exemptions (clerics, nobles, notables, officials, transport workers, miners, workers in 
manufacturing, artisans and apprentices, peasants owning land), was to pressure St 
Petersburg to enter the war and to redeploy its existing forces.134 Its hopes of Russian 
support were dashed when the tsarina, Catherine, who had just agreed to enter the con-
flict, died in 1796. In December that year Foreign Minister Thugut wrote to Franz de 
Colloredo-Waldsee, the Kabinettsminister since 1792:
Your Excellency can easily sense the incalculable consequences that could result from this fatal 
event, and in what embarrassment we might find ourselves in the midst of the great changes that 
might result: without an army, without finances, and with all of the internal disorder in the 
bureaucracy.135
Table 3. Strengths of German armies during the eighteenth century.
Year Austria Prussia Saxony Hanover Palatinate Bavaria
1702 110,000 26,000 27,000 18,900 18,000 27,000
1726 113,000 60,000 15,000 14,400 8,540 4,950
1740 108,000 81,000 27,800 22,700 8,390 9,000
1744 161,000 132,000 37,400 26,100 10,730 19,500
1750 150,000 137,000 22,320 21,940 12,500 6,290
1762 150,000 120,000 12,100 37,000 12,000 9,000
1765 170,000 150,000 26,620 14,000 11,590 8,000
1777 220,000 158,000 21,840 21,000 11,850 8,000
1790 281,850 200,000 22,900 17,000 15,750a
aThe Elector of Bavaria inherited the Palatinate at the end of December 1777.
Source: T.C.W. Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions That Made Modern Europe, 1648–1815 
(London, 2007), p. 608.
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Russia entered the war on 1 March 1799, after the formation of the Second Coalition in 
December 1798, too late to prevent the humiliating defeat of Austria in northern Italy in 
1796–7. Left on its own in 1796, the Habsburg monarchy attempted not to recruit more 
troops, but to move 25,000 of Field Marshal Dagobert Sigismund Wurmser’s troops 
from Germany to Italy in order to stop Bonaparte’s and Masséna’s advance. When French 
forces continued to move across northern Italy, in spite of reverses, the most common 
Austrian retort, lamented Thugut, was ‘the cry of all our marshals and the War Ministry 
that all is lost, that we are absolutely at the end of our rope, and that all that remains for 
us to do is to surrender’.136 The foreign minister was more optimistic when Austria went 
back to war in 1799, after losing its Italian territories through the Treaty of Campo 
Formio (1797), but his feelings were not shared, in the absence of increased recruitment 
and army reform, by military commanders, as Karl von Schwarzenberg confided to his 
wife from the army’s headquarters during a ceasefire in 1800: ‘I still hope that we are not 
so utterly senseless as to start [fighting] again, especially with our means in even worse 
condition than at the time we felt compelled to renew a less than honourable armistice.’137 
Little over one month later, on 3 December 1800, Habsburg forces – under the command 
of an 18-year-old Archduke Johann, after Archduke Karl had refused to countenance 
what he predicted would be the inevitable destruction of the army – were routed at the 
battle of Hohenlinden, and Austria was compelled to sue for peace.
Austrian commanders were forced to adapt to French reforms, most notably by creat-
ing a larger army, in spite of the near bankruptcy of the Habsburg state. Attempts to 
increase recruitment during the ‘first reform period’ (1801–5) under Archduke Karl – 
who had been given overall command of the army, at 29 years of age, after Austria’s 
defeat at Hohenlinden – had met with only limited success, with the Hungarian Diet 
rejecting the introduction of conscription in 1802 and agreeing to increase its contingent 
in the standing army to 63,264, compared to 52,000 in 1798, for a period of three years. 
The new conscription law of 25 October 1804 regulated recruitment by appointing per-
manent officers in each district, but it contained many exemptions and applied merely to 
the Austrian lands, except the Tyrol, and to Bohemia and Galicia. No popular levy, 
reported one of the archduke’s advisers, whether called a
militia, Landsturm, volunteers, Cerniden, insurrectio, or fencibles, in fact any armed force if it 
is not composed of trained troops, has any more hope of standing against our enemy than the 
papal soldiers or those of Cardinal Buffo – even if it were commanded by a Xenophon, 
Alexander, Turenne, Eugene, Montecuccoli, Condé, Friedrich or Bonaparte.138
As a consequence, Vienna failed in 1805 to muster the 320,000 troops pledged in its 
negotiations with London, in return for £400,000 per annum and a subsidy to defray the 
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costs of mobilization – payments which were never made because of the speed of 
Austria’s defeat. Karl Leiberich von Mack, having become de facto commander of 
Habsburg forces in 1805 after promising Emperor Franz I the quick mobilization of a 
large army, was unable to provide the 89,000 troops in Bavaria, 53,000 in Vorarlberg, and 
142,000 in Italy envisaged in the joint Russian and Austrian plan of 16 July: the main 
army in Italy, under Karl, numbered 95,000 and the army in Germany about half that 
initially, with further troops arriving from Italy and Switzerland. The chief of the quar-
termaster general staff, admittedly acting in support of Karl’s effort to avoid war, esti-
mated that the Austrian army could count on 60,000 fewer infantry and 20,000 fewer 
cavalry than at the start of its last campaign.
The measures introduced by Karl during the ‘second reform period’ (1806–9) remedied 
such deficits, with the introduction by decree of two reserve battalions per line regiment on 
12 May 1808, which were to be manned by previously unneeded ‘conscripts’, and the crea-
tion of a Landwehr by imperial patent on 9 June 1808, which made service compulsory for 
all men aged between 18 and 45, except for a smaller number of exemptions. Although the 
anticipated 180,000 Austrian and 50,000 Hungarian troops never materialized, Landwehr 
companies did assemble, with some battalions fighting alongside the regiments of the regu-
lar army in 1809. Along with the fuller use of conscription, the creation of reserves and a 
larger contingent from Hungary, which provided an extra 20,000 soldiers, the establish-
ment of the Landwehr allowed the monarchy to form a battlefield force of 283,401 and a 
sedentary contingent of 310,915 in 1809 (Table 4). After defeat at Wagram, Austria’s force 
on the rolls fell to 259,918, with 171,066 immediately available. By early 1812 the army 
had been ‘so extremely reduced and what remains of it is so badly paid, clothed and 
equipped that 60,000 men would be the most that the Government could at the present 
employ on active service’, wrote the British agent in Vienna, John Harcourt King.139 Yet 
the laws of conscription for the regular army, reserves, and Landwehr all remained in place, 
so that the Habsburg army could reconstitute itself in 1813 after Karl von Schwarzenberg 
had declared the neutrality of the Austrian corps on 30 January, having been cut off – with 
7,000 killed in battle and 4,000 dying of illness or exposure to the cold – from the retreating 
Grande Armée in Poland. With Clemens von Metternich, the Staatsminister and foreign 
minister since 1809, wishing to come to terms with Paris and trying to balance the twin 
threats of Russia and France, Vienna maintained its neutrality until 27 June, when it joined 
Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, and formally entered the war on 12 August 1813. In the 
meantime, it called up its conscripts from January onwards, reservists on 22 June, and the 
Landwehr on 6 July, assembling a total force of 479,000, with 298,000 combatants by the 
end of August. The monarchy eventually mobilized a total of 568,000 troops, making it the 
‘first power’ of the Coalition, in Metternich’s view, with the other powers ‘auxiliaries’.140
The territories annexed by France and the states of the Confederation of the Rhine 
were forced to expand their armies before Austria or Prussia. The revolutionary authori-
ties, which controlled the left bank of the Rhine from the end of 1794 onwards, had 
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elected not to impose conscription on the ‘liberated’ Rhinelanders and they had been 
unsuccessful in attracting volunteers, with Mont-Tonnerre (containing Mainz, Worms, 
and Speyer) furnishing a mere 57 recruits in the first half of 1799, for instance, out of a 
population of 400,000. The attempt to establish a ‘Legion of North Franks’ in July 1799 
was little more effective, counting approximately 2,000 volunteers at its height, includ-
ing Belgians and others, and experiencing 1,800 desertions.141 Formal annexation after 
the Peace of Lunéville (1801), however, permitted the introduction of conscription in 
1802 and a rapid increase in recruitment in the Rhineland, with all those aged between 
20 and 25 years classified as ‘conscripts’. By 1810 the Rhineland was providing 5,554 
conscripts per year, which was 42 per cent higher than the average for France as a whole, 
and amounted to 80,000 soldiers between 1802 and 1815 from a population of 1.6 mil-
lion, or about 30 per cent of the eligible age group, rising to almost 60 per cent in 1813.142
The states of the Rheinbund experienced a similar fate after 1806, and went on to 
contribute approximately 190,000 troops in 1812 to Napoleon’s armies.143 In the 1790s 
officials of the Reich had noted, in Württemberg and elsewhere, that ‘the proclivity of 
subjects against the institution of a land’s militia’ was ‘so great that they do not hesitate 
to voice their view openly’.144 Yet such subjects were obliged to comply with the gradual 
Table 4. Strength of Habsburg armed forces, 1809.
Troop numbers
Field forces  
 Line infantry 181,109
 9 Jäger battalions 10,200
 34 Grenzer battalions 38,525
 Reinforcements for third battalions 21,960
 Light and heavy cavalry 31,697
 283,491
Sedentary troops  
 Depot battalions 73,200
 First reserve of 46 German regiments 27,600
 Second reserve of 46 German regiments 32,200
 Third battalion of Grenzer regiments 20,400
 Landwehr 152,159
 Reserve cavalry squadrons 5,356
 310,915
Overall total 594,406
Source: Adapted from G.E. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian 
Army, 1792–1814 (Bloomington, IN, 1982), p. 126.
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introduction of conscription in the 1800s. In Baden, conscription for all those up to 30 
years of age replaced a cantonal system in 1808–9, increasing the state’s contingent from 
6,550 to 8,000, then to 10,000 men; a new conscription law in July 1812 ended most 
exemptions – nobles, civil servants, the educated, and commercial middle classes – in 
order to meet French demands for troops during the Russian and German wars in 1812–
13, at the end of which the Badenese contingent was 16,000, supplemented by 10,000 
men in the Landwehr, which had been formed in 1813 to match similar measures in 
Prussia.145 Württemberg was asked to supply France with 6,300 soldiers by the terms of 
Friedrich’s alliance with Napoleon in October 1805, and 12,000 troops, from an expanded 
territory and population, on entry into the Rheinbund in 1806, which obliged the govern-
ment to tighten the recruitment law of 1803, which had specified for the first time that all 
male subjects had a duty to serve in the army. Those liable for military service – eight 
years in the infantry, twelve in the cavalry during wartime – were not allowed to leave 
Württemberg, and in the case of evasion were stripped of political and legal rights, 
including the right of inheritance. Fathers could be punished in the absence of their sons. 
For its part, Bavaria had to provide 30,000 soldiers – double the number of its troops in 
1790 – for the French army as a condition of entering the Confederation of the Rhine, a 
figure that rose to 62,000 men in arms by 1809. Some 33,000 Bavarian troops were dis-
patched to the Grande Armée in 1812, of whom only 3,000 returned, and a further 30,000 
had to be found by the summer of 1813 in order to help Napoleon stop the advance of 
Prussia, Russia, and Austria in Saxony. Such levies went well beyond Napoleon’s pledge, 
over dinner with the Grand Duke of Baden in 1806, to make ‘the princes learn to defend 
their own lands’.146
Partly because of its long military tradition, which impressed even Napoleon ‘with the 
ancient glory’ of its army in Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand’s estimation, Prussia had 
done little to expand its forces during the years of peace after 1795 in order to meet the 
French challenge.147 With Saxony – counting 20,000 troops – as its sole ally, the 
Hohenzollern monarchy went to war in 1806 with an army of 245,000 men, half of them 
foreign mercenaries, and a field army of only 140,000, once Anton Wilhelm von 
L’Estocq’s defensive contingent in East Prussia and garrison and depot troops were 
deducted.148 The Napoleonic army, re-formed in the years of relative peace between 
1801 and 1803, consisted of 265 infantry battalions, 322 cavalry squadrons, and 202 bat-
teries of artillery, or about 300,000 men, supplemented by 63,000 troops from the states 
of the Rheinbund.149 Some 160,000 French troops advanced to Saxony from Bayreuth 
and Bamberg in three columns in early October 1806. By 1807, after the remnants of the 
Prussian army had retreated to East Prussia to join the two Russian armies – with 90,000 
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troops in total – reconstituted from the defeated Russo-Austrian forces of Austerlitz (2 
December 1805), the French army of observation in Germany and the Grande Armée in 
Poland, including foreign troops, numbered 400,000, from a European total of 600,000.150 
Although many Prussian officers had forecast victory in 1806, with Gebhard Leberecht 
von Blücher promising ‘One successful battle, and allies, money and supplies are ours 
from every corner of Europe,’ Napoleon himself could barely believe in September that 
Berlin would declare war, given the balance of forces:
The idea that Prussia could take me on single-handed is too absurd to merit discussion … She 
will go on acting as she has acted – arming today, disarming tomorrow, standing by, sword in 
hand, while the battle is fought, and then making terms with the victor.151
The actual disposition of forces on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstädt on 14 October 
was more equal than the total figures would suggest, with Napoleon commanding 55,600 
at the former – with a further 40,300 ready to join in the early afternoon – against 
Hohenlohe’s 40,000 men, and with Louis Nicolas Davout leading a corps of 27,300 
against Braunschweig’s 50,000 retreating troops at the latter. Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte’s 
force of 20,000 had been ordered to join whichever battle was nearest but remained sus-
pended between both, and Ernst von Rüchel’s 15,000 troops, who had been defending 
Weimar, arrived at Jena too late, during the afternoon. Together, therefore, France’s 
battlefield forces numbered 143,200 and Prussia’s 105,000. Arguably, however, the more 
important figure for the campaign as a whole, if Braunschweig’s army had not collapsed 
in the face of a force half of its size at the battle of Auerstädt, concerned the pool of 
trained replacement troops. Here, France enjoyed a clear advantage.
Prussian military reformers recognized France’s numerical superiority in 1806 and 
took steps to increase the size of the kingdom’s army. Such increases were prohibited by 
the Convention of Paris in September 1808, which limited the Prussian army to 42,000 
troops for the next ten years, at the same time as reallocating half of Prussia’s territory to 
Saxony, Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. To an extent the provisions of the 
convention were circumvented, in spite of the French occupation of Prussia, which 
allowed the early release of trained soldiers, whose records were kept, and the training of 
the next cohort. By August 1811, 74,413 trained soldiers were – if one estimate is to be 
believed – already available for immediate mobilization.152 The most important meas-
ures, though, were discussed within the Military Reorganization Commission and con-
cerned what was to happen after the French occupation, which appeared, as a consequence 
of Russia’s uncertain stance, at least contestable. Early in 1810 the commission recom-
mended the introduction of universal conscription without exemptions. It was opposed 
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by Stein’s successor as interior minister Alexander zu Dohna-Schlobitten; by prominent 
reform-minded advisers such as Ludwig von Vincke and Barthold Georg Niebuhr, who 
denounced conscription as an enemy of culture; by the commercial classes of cities such 
as Königsberg, which were the most ardent opponents, according to Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Goetzen; and by much of the aristocracy, which saw universal conscription – in the 
words of one East Prussian petition – as ‘the child of a revolution that had smashed all 
existing arrangements and conditions in France’ and ‘can be based only on the concept 
of universal equality’, which would ‘lead to the complete destruction of the nobility’.153
As usual, the king was undecided. Having avowed the necessity of ‘eine allgemeine 
Konskription’ he refused to sanction its passage into law in December 1808 and blocked 
it again in 1810.154 As soon as the French had withdrawn, however, after the catastrophic 
failure of the Grande Armée’s invasion of Russia in 1812, and before Prussia had for-
mally declared war on France on 16 March 1813, the recommendations of reformers – 
within a new committee set up by the king in Breslau and led by Scharnhorst – were 
rapidly put into effect. Notably, these were universal conscription for the army of the line 
on 9 February 1813; the establishment of volunteer Jäger detachments for the propertied 
classes, able to pay for their equipment and uniforms, on 3 February; the formation of a 
Landwehr for all men aged between 17 and 40 not serving in the regular army or Jäger 
on 17 March; and the creation of the Landsturm, or home-defence force, for all remain-
ing men, either too old or physically unfit to serve in the Landwehr, in April 1813.
The Prussian forces brought into being by conscription in 1813 differed in kind from 
those of the old standing army.155 While it is true that the Kantonreglement (1733) made 
military service compulsory in theory, it did so by assigning each regiment of the army a 
recruitment district, from which it found its quota of ‘native’ troops. All young males in 
the district were enrolled on regimental lists, but only a small proportion was enlisted 
and numerous exemptions were granted, covering the nobility, the clergy, civil servants, 
the educated and propertied, some prosperous artisans and peasants, and workers in 
industries of interest to the state. From a total population of 8.7 million in 1799, 530,000 
men were exempt and 1,170,000 resided in Prussian territories beyond the cantons.156 In 
the Teltow district of Kurmark, for example, there were 29 resident soldiers in army 
service and 224 serving sons out of 5,552 enrolled men in 1750, and 216 resident soldiers 
and 235 serving sons out of 6,627 in 1801.157 If an insufficient number of volunteers 
came forward, ‘native’ recruits were selected, after 1763, by a staff officer from the regi-
ment and a rural commissioner, both of whom often came from, or were 
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closely connected to, local noble landowners. They were joined by a large number of 
mercenaries from abroad, since the proportion of ‘natives’ to ‘foreigners’ – those 
recruited, frequently by guile or force, from outside the recruiting district, mostly also 
from outside Prussia – was deliberately kept roughly equal in order to maintain the 
domestic, largely agricultural, labour force. Although on active duty for only two months 
per year, in April and May, under the furlough system, soldiers served for life until 1792, 
when the period of service was reduced to 20 years.
Such a system was unequal and authoritarian, resting on the discipline, often resented, 
of noble-dominated rural localities and of the noble-officered regiments: ‘we have to 
fight over every recruit with his lord’, wrote Yorck in August 1811, and ‘miserable ego-
tism is the only dominant passion’.158 The system also led to the recruitment of those 
least able to resist, prompting officers’ complaints about their poor ‘quality’. 
‘Transgressions against discipline continue to be very frequent despite all efforts of the 
commanding officers, and this, too, is the result of the bad composition of the troops,’ 
Yorck had written to the king a year earlier: ‘The Kantonreglement protects everyone 
who is not a complete vagabond or beggar.’159 The reforms of 1813, which created a 
system of conscription – with the word itself being contrasted by reformers with the term 
‘canton system’ – for all adult males without exemptions, transformed the Prussian army, 
creating 12,000 Jäger, who often replaced officers of the line, by the end of 1813, and 
120,000 soldiers of the Landwehr, who were organized in separate regiments with their 
own uniforms but who fought alongside regiments of the regular army during and after 
the autumn of 1813.160 Prussia’s 270,000–280,000 mobilized troops in 1813 were added 
to those of Russia, Austria, and other allies to create a combined force of about 800,000 
or 570,000 in the field, compared with 600,000 in the French-led ‘army of the nations’, 
of whom 410,000 could be used in battle.161 Not only did such levies give the Coalition 
an overall numerical advantage for the first time since 1792, they also altered the indi-
vidual armies and changed soldiers’ experiences of warfare, with more than one in four 
adult males in Prussia sent into the field in 1813 alone.
Paradoxically, the size of the Coalition armies between 1813 and 1815 permitted their 
commanders to mimic the strategy of their eighteenth-century predecessors. Josef 
Radetzky von Radetz, the author of the allied Trachtenberg Plan adopted in July 1813, 
favoured ‘a system of defence combined with offensive operations on a small scale over 
a general offensive movement, which might win much, but also might lose all’.162 As in 
Russia in 1812, allied armies were to retire if attacked by Napoleon, while the other 
Coalition forces arrived, wearing the French corps down through attrition and hemming 
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them in, before a final concentric allied advance with superior numbers of troops. Such 
strategic manoeuvring took place in Saxony in the autumn of 1813, after early defeats 
inflicted on Blücher at Grossgörschen (2 May), Peter von Wittgenstein at Bautzen (20–1 
May), and Schwarzenberg at Dresden (26–7 August), with 335,000 troops of the allies 
eventually facing 190,000 French-led soldiers at Leipzig (16–19 October). The strategy 
for the Coalition’s invasion of France in early 1814 proceeded in a similar fashion: 
Schwarzenberg advanced cautiously with the army of Bohemia through Switzerland in 
order to avoid French forts to the north, before linking up with the army of Silesia in the 
Marne. Napoleon attacked Blücher near Brienne, but the Prussian commander withdrew 
until reinforced at La Rothière (29 January); he defeated Schwarzenberg at Montereau 
(17–18 February), but the Austrians retreated to Troyes in order not to risk being 
destroyed. Further assaults by Napoleon against the superior numbers of the army of 
Silesia, backed up by the army of the north, near Laon on 8–9 March – with 37,000 
troops against Blücher’s 85,000 – and against the army of Bohemia at Arcis-sur-Aube on 
20 March, with 30,000 against 100,000, were repulsed.
As Napoleon marched east to threaten the allies’ lines of communication, the com-
bined armies of the Coalition continued in the other direction with 200,000 men and 
occupied Paris by 30 March, prompting Napoleon’s senior commanders to mutiny 
rather than back the emperor’s last-ditch march back to the capital with 36,000 soldiers. 
Thus, although the Coalition had conducted a war of attrition and manoeuvre, it had 
done so with mass armies of raw conscripts, with under a third of Austrian soldiers fully 
trained – ‘peasants in uniform’, in Radetzky’s words – and the majority ‘drenched to the 
bones, most of them without shoes, many without great coats’, according to the report 
of one British military observer in August 1813.163 In such circumstances the Austrians 
had been obliged to simplify their tactics, to pay less attention to lines of supply, to live 
off the land to a greater extent, to keep their forces together, to escape from and catch 
up with the enemy – at a speed of 15 miles per day in pursuit of the French in late 1813 
– through forced marches, to accept large-scale losses, and to rely, with an overwhelm-
ing number of troops, on decisive battles. All such changes at once reflected and rein-
forced the transformation of contemporaries’ conception of war during the Napoleonic 
period.
IV. Conclusion
Even in Austria, which remained the most independent of the German states, warfare had 
become broader in scope after 1792, with mass armies requiring more money and men, 
and it had become more intense, with a greater number of battles and higher rates of kill-
ing, compared with the previous conflicts of the eighteenth century. War was an every-
day or recurring reality for many subjects, and became a central part of their dealings 
with the state and other authorities. As one pamphleteer put it in July 1813, ‘Europe’s 
 at University College London on August 5, 2014wih.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
488 War in History 20(4)
164 Anonymous pamphlet, July 1813, cited in H.-B. Spies, ed., Die Erhebung gegen Napoleon 
1806–1815 (Darmstadt, 1981), p. 304.
165 K.A. Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten, 6 vols (Mannheim, 1837–42), vol. 1, pp. 104, 
169–71, and vol. 2, p. 135.
166 Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, p. 104.
167 Many commentators opposed both positions, of course. For more on this question, see M. 
Hewitson, ‘Belligerence, Patriotism and Nationalism in the German Public Sphere, 1792–
1815’, English Historical Review CXXVIII (2013), pp. 839–76.
168 Broers, ‘Concept of “Total War”’.
population has been turning itself into an army for the last twenty years, and its cities and 
villages have become one great camp.’164 The continuing conflicts had not merely 
become a more regular feature of subjects’ daily lives, they had also become a more 
important one, defining conscripts’ and civilians’ very existence, in many cases. Thus, 
even a previous bystander such as the Rhinelander August Varnhagen von Ense, who had 
rejoiced at the ‘blessed’ circumstances of his life in 1803 and had lacked ‘true political 
elan’ even after the defeat of Austria in 1805, had been moved by France’s occupation of 
Prussia after 1806 and by its defeat of the Habsburg monarchy in 1809 to enlist in the 
Austrian and, later, the Russian and Prussian armies, and pronounced himself ‘ready for 
anything’ by 1812, after the vanquishing of the Grande Armée.165 For such contemporar-
ies, battles of ‘annihilation’ and ‘national’ or ‘patriotic’ defence, combined with a revo-
lutionary or Napoleonic redefining of territorial states and reordering of the European 
states’ system, had brought into question the very existence of most German states and, 
from many educated observers’ point of view, the future of a putative German nation. 
‘Austria faces a terrible crisis,’ Archduke Karl warned his brother, the emperor, after 
defeat at Austerlitz in 1805:
Your Majesty stands alone at the end of a short but horrible war; your country is devastated, 
your treasury empty, your credit lost, the honour of your arms diminished, your reputation 
tarnished and the economic well-being of your subjects ruined for many years. The devotion of 
your people is shaky, you have no allies.166
The evidence suggests that, in the German lands at least, the advent, duration, and nature 
of mass warfare during the Napoleonic period had produced political effects which were 
difficult to foresee or control. These effects were largely the corollary of new types of 
mass warfare and conscription, forced on military and official elites, who often remained 
in power, by French victories. Military reforms were undertaken out of necessity, not 
because of a wider ‘ideological’ or ‘political’ dynamic, and notwithstanding public sup-
port for reformed German military organizations and forces, which contrasted with 
earlier criticism of ‘absolutist’ standing armies.167 In this respect, Broers’s criticism of 
Bell is justified.168
The human costs and economic burdens which resulted from mass warfare were 
nevertheless unexpectedly heavy, with more significant consequences than those 
described by Planert. In Prussia, to reformers such as Gneisenau, ‘invasion’ by the enemy 
was synonymous not merely with the ‘annihilation’ of an army in a decisive battle, but 
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with the annihilation of the state.169 If the French ‘tyrant’ had not yet toppled the throne 
of the Prussian monarch, ‘we should thank the circumstance that Austria has not yet been 
subjugated and the plans of the French cabinet against Russia are not yet ready to be car-
ried out’, he had written in a memorandum of 1808: ‘Sooner or later, we should expect 
to be removed from the ranks of independent peoples (Völker).’170 Since the kingdom’s 
standing army was not sufficient on its own to offer the prospect, or even the ‘probabil-
ity’, ‘of a successful outcome’, it was necessary to contemplate ‘sources of resistance 
which governments have until now neglected or feared’, namely, ‘the arming of the 
people’.171 The motto that ‘You are either with us or against us’, with any cooperation 
classified as ‘high treason’ and punished with execution, would have radically altered 
previous conventions, as would the orchestration of a ‘popular uprising’ (Volksaufstand) 
against an invading or occupying army, blurring the boundary ‘between combatants and 
non-combatants, with the possibility that civilians would be killed like soldiers on the 
battlefield’.172 Militia units were to hide in the woods or mountains and to operate during 
the night, attacking and unsettling an occupying power. The named militia leaders were 
to be given, ‘during an enemy invasion’, ‘the right over life and death, the goods and 
blood of the inhabitants for the purpose of the defence of the country’.173
In the event, such plans were not put into effect, because when the war with France 
came, as Gneisenau and others were sure it would between 1807 and 1811, it occurred in 
concert with Austrian and Russian allies and after the collapse of the Grande Armée in 
1812, making a military victory over Napoleon seem more likely and the necessity of a 
popular ‘insurrection’ more remote.174 The fact that the leaders of the reformed Prussian 
army were willing to think in such terms, however, with the expressed aim of extending 
their plans to the 15 million inhabitants of the ‘German nation’, betrays in extremis the 
extent to which warfare had changed. No other German power countenanced this type of 
uprising and conflict, involving the entire populace, but most had already accepted or 
adapted to the transition towards Volkskriege or ‘people’s wars’. War was not ‘total’ in 
the twentieth-century meaning of the word, but it had become ‘popular’ and participa-
tory. The raising of mass armies of conscripts in revolutionary and Napoleonic France 
had compelled the majority of German states, either through compliance with French 
requests or through imitation, to adopt similar measures themselves, prompting a trans-
formation of the ways in which wars were fought – and, therefore, experienced – and 
entailing fundamental political, social, and economic adjustments on the part of govern-
ments and most sections of the population during the period of the wars themselves and 
during their immediate aftermath.
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Although the impact of combat remained uneven, many onlookers – perhaps, even, 
most – had come to view ‘war’ as a new, enduring and defining feature of their lives. 
From this point of view, the majority of German polities and societies, it can be held, 
stood under the shadow of war between 1792 and 1815, whereas they had existed in an 
ambiguously defined state of peace or had avoided many of the worst consequences of 
conflict for much of the preceding century. After 1815, under the stabilized political 
forms of the German Confederation and during an era of more strictly delimited and 
enforced peace, it could appear that the changes of the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
periods had been reversed. Yet popular and elite conceptions of warfare had altered, with 
fears of revolutionary violence – at home and abroad – and of civil war helping to per-
petuate a purported ‘restoration’.175 In this limited but immeasurable sense, in spite of the 
case put forward by Planert and others about the continuity of eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century conflicts, the majority of the German lands had experienced a second 
military revolution.
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